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Abstract
Scholars and practitioners are increasingly questioning formal disaster governance (FDG) approaches as being too rigid,
slow, and command-and-control driven. Too often, local realities and non-formal influences are sidelined or ignored to
the extent that disaster governance can be harmed through the efforts to impose formal and/or political structures. A con-
trasting narrative emphasises so-called bottom-up, local, and/or participatory approaches which this article proposes to
encapsulate as Informal Disaster Governance (IDG). This article theorises IDG and situates it within the long-standing albeit
limited literature on the topic, paying particular attention to the literature’s failure to properly define informal disaster risk
reduction and response efforts, to conceptualise their far-reaching extent and consequences, and to consider their ‘dark
sides.’ By presenting IDG as a framework, this article restores the conceptual importance and balance of IDG vis-à-vis FDG,
paving the way for a better understanding of the ‘complete’ picture of disaster governance. This framework is then con-
sidered in a location where IDG might be expected to be more powerful or obvious, namely in a smaller, more isolated,
and tightly knit community, characteristics which are stereotypically used to describe island locations. Thus, Svalbard in
the Arctic has been chosen as a case study, including its handling of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, to explore the merits
and challenges with shifting the politics of disaster governance towards IDG.
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1. Introduction
Over the past century, societies have devised vast for-
mal disaster governance (FDG) mechanisms. Yet, when
vulnerabilities and risks become disasters, governmen-
tal and other formal institutions mandated with disas-
ter risk reduction and response (DRR/R) show limitations.
Scholars critiquing FDG attribute these shortcomings to,
amongst others, the lack of knowledge, incentives, co-
ordination mechanisms, or flexibility, as well as focus-
ing on infrastructural and technocratic solutions over
engaging with existing local resources, including knowl-
edge, wisdom, learning, contextual understanding, in-
centives, people power, and other requirements that
FDG cannot or does not provide (Boin, 2009; Lagadec,
1997; Perrow, 2011; Roasa, 2013; Robin, Chazal, Acuto, &
Carrero, 2019). As a specific example, Marchezini (2015)
suggests that governmental FDG might sometimes focus
on saving individual lives without linking this approach to
wider social needs.
In the absence of (effective) FDG, including when
climate change continues to be separated from DRR/R
by authors such as Grove (2014), successful DRR/R of-
ten depends on informal actors and networks (Boersma
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et al., 2019; Carrero et al., 2019; Fritz & Mathewson,
1957; Rose & Chmutina, in press) and their “urgently
needed tools for knowledge and action” (Fawaz, 2017,
p. 101). Such informal DRR/R shifts action away from
the government to ordinary people who, often without
disaster-related training, devise informal approaches—
e.g., by improvising new or repurposing old informal
networks—to supply the much-needed aid normally ex-
pected of FDG. Examples of actions are building bar-
riers against hazards, evacuating residents, providing
food, water, medical assistance, and emotional sup-
port, and leading local clean-up, rebuilding, and re-
location efforts (Barenstein & Trachsel, 2012; Carrero
et al., 2019; McFarlane, 2012; Parthasarathy, 2015;
Roasa, 2013; Whittaker, McLennan, & Handmer, 2015).
Disaster-affected populations are not only the first to re-
spond to disasters—recently termed zero-order respon-
ders (Briones, Vachon, & Glantz, 2019)—but they also of-
ten go beyond their perceived responsibilities to make
up for institutional shortcomings (Edwards, 2009; Lavell
& Maskrey, 2014; Maskrey, 2011; Stallings & Quarantelli,
1985). Accordingly, informal DRR/R activities may en-
compass long-term development or political and diplo-
matic agendas that sometimes are opposed to, or by-
pass, governments (Ide, 2020). As their activities, includ-
ing by some of the most vulnerable populations, may re-
sult in the difference between success and failure of a
community’s DRR/R (Barenstein & Trachsel, 2012; Roasa,
2013), informal DRR/R actors may become a powerful
(counter-)force creating de facto ‘new realities’ in ways
unanticipated and/or undesired by FDG actors.
Informal human agency, a prevalent theme across
many academic disciplines, has been discussed in ear-
lier and recent disaster science, predominantly from
the perspectives of intra- and interorganisational infor-
mality or as a volunteering/emerging practice by infor-
mal actors. Over time, and as informality theoretically
became increasingly acceptable with the ‘governance
turn’ in the 1990s, a variety of perspectives and terms
related to informal forms of DRR/R developed, even
when drawing on much earlier literature. These include
self-organisation, convergence, volunteerism, and emer-
gence. Recent additions are multilevel/vertical/hori-
zontal/adaptive/collective/collaborative/decentralised/
local/shadow/networked/grassroots/bottom-up/parti-
cipatory/community-based DRR/R, disaster governance,
or disaster networks. In practice, in an environment
which views DRR/R as the responsibility of formal or-
ganisations (e.g., governmental and non-governmental
disaster management agencies and emergency services),
informal DRR/R actors still tend to be ignored, managed,
bypassed, or ousted by FDG actors once they are on
the scene (Wolbers, Ferguson, Groenewegen, Mulder, &
Boersma, 2016).
Notwithstanding the breadth of references acknowl-
edging the importance of, and bringing important in-
sights to, the complexities of informal DRR/R, knowl-
edge on informality in disasters can remain superficial,
lack conceptual discussions and incompletely address
practical considerations. Its wider and especially politi-
cal implications are rarely examined by aforementioned
functionalist critiques of FDG and their explanations of in-
formal DRR/R. Consequently, informal actors are deroga-
torily seen as little more than ‘volunteers.’ Where infor-
mal DRR/R is seen as a viable alternative, this is often
limited to equally functional characteristics such as abil-
ity to respond faster and more flexibly than FDG actors.
This raises doubts as to whether scholars dealing with
informal DRR/R have truly detached from these tradi-
tional dichotomies, especially when their analyses often
lead to the question of how to improve FDG by ‘man-
aging’ these efforts, so that these will not hinder for-
mal efforts—whereas the logical consideration should
perhaps be how to capitalise on informality as an asset,
and how FDG could ‘serve’ capable communities in dis-
asters rather than manage their efforts (Ogie & Pradhan,
2019). Perhaps these accounts offer more insights on
how the involvement of informal actors in disasters is,
and has been, imagined and managed by FDG rather than
considering them as an integral part of disaster gover-
nance per se.
Thus, the theoretical contribution of this article lies
in stepping back and examining more fully the meanings
and implications of informal DRR/R. In the next section,
after a definitional discussion, we discuss the DRR/R lit-
erature’s limitations on informal DRR/R by focusing on
three major gaps, the failures to: define informal DRR/R
(Section 2.2); treat it as more than volunteerism, and
to acknowledge the political dimension and clout of in-
formal DRR/R (Section 2.3); and discuss its ‘dark sides’
(Section 2.4). To ground the above, we use the Arctic
archipelago of Svalbard and the ongoing Covid-19 pan-
demic as an empirical case study. We conclude by sug-
gesting the concept of ‘informal disaster governance’
(IDG) as a broader framework to comprehensively en-
compass informality in DRR/R.
2. Gaps in Understanding Informality in DRR/R
2.1. Defining Disaster-Related Governance
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) refers to policies, actions,
and activities aimed at understanding and addressing
the root causes of disasters (Hewitt, 1983; Lewis, 1999;
Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004), with exam-
ples of phrases used being mitigation, prevention, pre-
paredness, preparation, planning, readiness, and capac-
ity building. Actions during and after a disaster—such
as emergency management, rescue, response, recovery,
and reconstruction—are not explicitly part of DRR, al-
though DRR should be part of them (Cuny, 1994). Thus,
the idea of DRR/R helps to connect all aspects of dealing
with disasters: before, during, after, and their links and
feedbacks. While the final ‘R’ is ostensibly used to mean
‘response,’ just as DRR implies the slew of words listed
above, R implies the various other actions and activities
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not encompassed by DRR. Research, policy, and practice
use various other phrases in different ways, such as disas-
ter risk management and disaster risk reduction and man-
agement. The key is to recognise the diversity of vocabu-
lary which exists, but to select a shorthand for the wide
range of activities referred to, for which we use DRR/R.
In the context of DRR/R governance, typically if am-
biguously described as ‘disaster governance’ or ‘disas-
ter risk governance’ (even though these phrases are
not synonymous), ‘governance’ means the rules, regula-
tions, norms, systems, and institutions directing, defin-
ing, guiding, monitoring, and implementing (i.e., govern-
ing) DRR/R (Peters & Pierre, 1998; Rosenau & Czempiel,
1992). Government is one such system and institution,
which is formal in terms of having a specific struc-
ture, form, and individuals identified with the institution.
Formality implies some fashion or mode of specificity
which can be demarcated and systemised, with the pos-
sibility of emulation or repetition, hence FDG.
Emphasising historical roots, some scholars point
to formal disaster institutions’ outdated design as the
source of fundamental challenges and inefficiencies
within DRR/R (Kirschenbaum, 2004; Quarantelli, Lagadec,
& Boin, 2007). Despite changes and advances in how dis-
asters are tackled, the baseline structures and forms of
today’s formal disaster-related institutions were devised
more than a century ago to fit the risks and needs of
the perceived rising complexities of the industrialisation
era (Kirschenbaum, 2004). The elicited response came
in the form of centralised, hierarchical, command-and-
control driven approaches. This perspective and modus
operandi was reinforced further by the two 20th cen-
tury World Wars and it continued through to the end
of the Cold War, an era in which DRR/R was primarily
seen as a question of civil defence with the underlying as-
sumption that taking ‘control’ is the most suitable prac-
tise to deal with the ‘chaos of disasters’ (Dynes, 1994;
Gilbert, 1995; Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004; Quarantelli
& Dynes, 1977; Wolbers et al., 2016; Wolf & Pfohl, 2014).
This militaristic approach pervades many formal disas-
ter operations to this day, notwithstanding the disas-
ter governance emphasis that followed (Tierney, Bevc, &
Kuligowski, 2006; Wolbers et al., 2016). This situation is
not only due to DRR/R’s historical embeddedness in a
military perspective, but also as result of concerns over
Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear-related is-
sues as part of DRR/R (Strömberg, 2019).
Another issue arises in that FDG often separates
and dilutes DRR/R activities among different institu-
tions with their own rivalries, territorialism, and man-
dates, irrespective of overlaps and cooperation. To il-
lustrate at a governmental level, governments such
as the UK and US divide much of the responsi-
bility for overseas disaster response, overseas DRR,
domestic disaster response, and domestic DRR. The
UN system has separate agencies for coordinating
humanitarian affairs (Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs), disaster risk reduction (Office
for Disaster Risk Reduction), development (United
Nations Development Programme), and climate change
(Framework Convention on Climate Change).
The critique of formal institutions as rigid, bureau-
cratic, and thus inflexible is common (Boin, Rhinard, &
Ekengren, 2014; Dynes & Aguirre, 1979; Wachtendorf,
2000). Others contest this approach as being too
simplistic (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Boersma, Comfort,
Groenendaal, & Wolbers, 2014), citing the capacity of
command-and-control approaches to adapt to chang-
ing circumstances through, for instance, swapping pre-
determined roles or making choices as to which parts
of the command structure are necessary and useful
for any given situation. An example is the evolution of
the Incident Command System and its application to
hospitals (Bahrami, Ardalan, Nejati, Ostadtaghizadeh, &
Yari, 2020). Nonetheless, FDG has been characterised
as “choices looking for problems, issues and feelings
looking for decision situations in which they might be
aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might
be an answer, and decision makers looking for work”
(Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972, p. 1). Yet governance
which is entirely anarchist would run into its own prob-
lems through lack of systemisation, regulations, imple-
mentation, monitoring, and enforcement, leading to the
high rate of disaster deaths seen in circumstances such
as the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Mika, 2019) and the lack
of a tsunami warning system across the Indian Ocean on
26 December 2004 compared to locations which had a lo-
cal one, thereby saving lives (Gaillard et al., 2008). A bal-
ance between FDG and systems without formality would
perhaps be needed for DRR/R.
2.2. Defining Informality
Considering DRR/R governance that is not formal, the
supposed antonym ‘informal’ is the obvious choice, lead-
ing to IDG. The definition of ‘informal’ is suggested as be-
ing ‘not formal,’ but that would literally be ‘non-formal.’
‘Informal,’ instead, is suggested as ad hoc or impromptu
interactions between, and actions of, individuals and or-
ganisations, with the interactions being sudden, behind
the scenes, casual, offhand, or unplanned (Kapucu, 2012;
Wachtendorf, 2000; Zhuravsky, 2015). Others employ dis-
tinctions between state or recognised organisational for-
mal DRR/R compared to civic DRR/R which, by default,
becomes informal (Radcliffe, 2016; Sadri et al., 2018;
Strömberg, 2019). Still others differentiate between at-
tributes of institutionalised formal networks—which fol-
low relatively set norms, ranges of actors, and rules of
communication (but can also accommodate institutional
informality)—and those of informal networks which are
said to be ad hoc, although often based on repurposing
previous networks to be fluid and ephemeral (Carrero
et al., 2019; Chatfield & Reddick, 2018; Meyer, 2017;
Sadri et al., 2018). Few look into how informal DRR/R
reinforces informal norms, their relationship with for-
mal/enforced norms, and the potential of the former to
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change the latter and vice versa (Ng, 2016; Roasa, 2013;
Toope, 2008; Tsai, 2006; Wolf & Pfohl, 2014).
Overall, no satisfactory, cohesive, or operational defi-
nition is offered, partly because of the informality. When
considering IDG, it is often implicitly or explicitly posited
as the ‘other,’ ‘parallel,’ ‘shadow,’ or ‘alternative’ ap-
proach. That is, IDG is considered to be DRR/R gover-
nance which is not FDG, so it is defined in the context
of what it is not, rather than what it is. Rather than a
complementary approach to FDG, IDG is seen in dichoto-
mous terms and it is easy to see why: governmental/civic,
public/shadow (networks), and informal/formal straight
away evoke the perception of opposites. Yet scholars
studying in/formality have debated their characteristics
and questioned the oversimplified generalisation of re-
ality this dichotomy evokes (Toope, 2008). By definition,
the formal-informal divide is a static conceptualisation,
hiding the dynamics of what others propose is a con-
tinuum, with the depth or the existence of the formal-
informal divide questioned (Sindzingre, 2006).
Ultimately, ephemeral concepts such as informality
may defy the possibility of an overall or entirely accepted
definition. At least initially, such definitions tend to be
overly narrow for the sake of usefulness and they run the
risks of oversimplification and promiscuous application.
Are peoples’ actions and norms that do not fit within the
confines of the formal, necessarily informal? Or are they
simply different? As Foweraker (2007, p. 407) states with
respect to the treatment of informality in political sci-
ence: “There are many forms of political behaviour, or-
ganisation and belief that cannot and should not be sub-
sumed into the notion of informal rules.” As an example
from disaster science, this is apparent in indigenous peo-
ples’ DRR/R (e.g., Lambert & Scott, 2019; Yumagulova
et al., in press). Are indigenous actions that are not
validated or mandated by the current government or
systems informal by definition? Indigenous structures
may be based on formal systems that have existed for
far longer than the current ‘recognised’ DRR/R regimes.
Other such examples include tribal or religious laws (e.g.,
the Albanian ‘Kanun’).
For studying IDG, here meaning informal DRR/R and
its actors, we suggest embracing this seeming contradic-
tion. Many IDG and FDG actors and efforts are to be
found somewhere along a continuum as, for instance,
formal actors act informally or vice versa. For instance,
Alexander (2010) distinguishes between emergency re-
sponse volunteers with different levels of spontaneity
and organisation, indicating now the level of formal-
ity or informality with which they contribute can de-
pend on their training, their level of integration with
other involved institutions, and the volunteerism culture.
Nonetheless, some intrinsic features of either informality
or formality create a definite discontinuity between the
two. Despite the regular or potential institutionalisation
of initially informal acts, some are unlikely to ever make
it into the formal sphere when their inherent features
are fundamentally at odds with the inherent features
of FDG; for example, legal avoidance strategies, such as
the Japanese mafia providing aid after the 1995 Kobe
earthquake (Horwich, 2000) and the Italian mafia be-
ing accused of both increasing and decreasing the earth-
quake vulnerability of houses (Massazza, Brewin, & Joffe,
2019). Thus, IDG is not the opposite of FDG. Rather, it is
a complementary, albeit underutilised and often little ex-
plained, part of the DRR/R governance spectrum.
2.3. Reach: Informal DRR/R beyond Volunteerism
Much of the current research on IDG takes a functionalist
perspective, highlighting advantages in efficiency and ef-
ficacy over FDG. This perspective is a logical starting point
and can be traced to the study of informal governance
in political science in the 1980s and 1990s which con-
vincingly argued for integrating more flexibility into in-
stitutional settings to enable continuous learning, adap-
tation, and quick readjustment of processes in the face
of perceived increasing uncertainty (De Burca, Keohane,
& Sabel, 2013). Such a functionalist rationale distracts
from the agents of IDG and FDG, neglecting the deeper di-
mension of conflicting interests and power differentials
within both IDG and FDG.
Yet IDG involves a variety of actors and agendas.
Much of the functionalist critiques conceive of IDG ac-
tors as constrained in time (until FDG actors take charge),
space (within the disaster’s geographic constraints), and
function/mandate (meeting immediate DRR/R needs).
Unsurprisingly, IDG actors are thought of as temporarily
filling in FDG gaps and are, ultimately, to be managed,
including through ostensibly ‘participatory approaches.’
The reach of IDG actors and their efforts, though, of-
ten goes far beyond any perceived temporal, geographic,
functional, and political boundaries.
Many disaster scenarios require IDG actors to take re-
sponsibility for their own DRR/R far beyond the immedi-
ate response phase, such as in situations in which FDG
actors do not arrive at all; for instance, when a disaster
has not been officially declared or FDG actors do not wish
to get involved. The subsequent lack of attention and/or
funds obtained by FDG actors impedes their activities.
Then, it is up to IDG actors to take responsibility for the
disaster-related needs, including the following recovery
and development phases which can outlast any initial dis-
aster response by years and even decades. These efforts
can rarely be understood exclusively through terms like
‘volunteerism’ or ‘self-help,’ which themselves are very
different, as they tend to emphasise limited engagement
with respect to IDG actors’ time and responsibility.
In fact, IDG may have potentially far-reaching societal
and political implications. IDG does not happen in a vac-
uum but, put simply, may challenge old norms and, by
extension, set new ones. Within this, there is a complex
and complicated interplay between power, culture, and
norms, in that existing FDG shapes the creation and de-
velopment of IDG action. The reverse also occurs. IDG ac-
tors may equally set new norms against which (future)
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FDG actions will be pitched and bought into, or not (Tsai,
2006). These can be understood as being in between
(i) Nye’s (1990, p. 167) concept of ‘soft power’ from “in-
tangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and
institutions” and (ii) more classic or realist accounts of
norm generation. That is, IDG has the potential to set
norms—through negotiation within emerging hybrid re-
lationships (e.g., beyond state-state, private-private), or
through in/direct coercion—by establishing path depen-
dencies through appealing alternatives that may seep
into peoples’ strategic cultures and, thus, exert influ-
ence over the acceptance, as well as the changing, of
FDG’s strategic culture (Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, & Auld,
2012; Tsai, 2006; Wolf & Pfohl, 2014).
In this way, IDG also constitutes the environment
within which FDG is accepted, enabled, constrained, or
rejected. In the framework by Helmke and Levitsky (2004,
2006), FDG and IDG may thus either converge (by being
complementary or substitutive) or diverge (resulting in
behaviour which is competing or which tolerates differ-
ences without approving or engaging with them). FDG is
embedded within shared expectations which create the
‘rules of the game,’ dictating the effectiveness and stabil-
ity of the current framework. Governance, through set-
ting standards, blurs classic dividing lines between the
public and the private, and between the national and the
non-national.
In other cases, IDG may eschew any formal engage-
ment. In theory, partially thanks to the apposite focus
on vulnerabilities as the causative factors of disasters
(Hewitt, 1983; Lewis, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004), disas-
ter science has recently paid more attention to those ig-
nored or bypassed by FDG. But what about turning this
around to ask: What does it mean to ignore FDG? The
implicit demand of FDG is to pay attention to formal ap-
proaches, processes, and institutions. ‘Ignoring’—that is,
the lack of attention to FDG institutions—may constitute
indirect or direct contention with FDG’s practices and,
sometimes, with FDG as a system per se. ‘Governance
beyond/without government’ (Ng, 2016; Peters & Pierre,
1998; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992) becomes possible and,
in order to achieve civic goals, desired for establishing
new alliances. These informal or grassroot movements
are not only about shifting identities but, similar to clas-
sical politics, remain deeply political whether in standard
‘us vs. them’ terms or as ‘agonistic pluralism,’ where
the other’s legitimacy is recognised yet not reconciled
(Mouffe, 2013).
2.4. The Dark Side(s) of IDG
IDG is subject to many of the ‘dark sides’ of DRR/R gov-
ernance in general. Any form of governance can pro-
duce unintended path dependencies or adverse impacts,
meaning that caution is inevitably warranted. This sec-
tion presents some of these negative aspects as a means
of balancing the ostensibly positive nature of IDG re-
ferred to thus far, especially when considering literature
on community-based or participatory DRR/R. In the case
of IDG, presenting these drawbacks is particularly impor-
tant since the lack of focused attention that the topic
has received to date may not have resulted in the same
counter-measures as for FDG. Like FDG, informality has
a clear potential to be less positive and potentially cause
harm, with lessons drawn from FDG and related formal
mechanisms (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Hickey & Mohan,
2005; Ide, 2020). Much relates to imbalanced distribu-
tions of power inherent in any system, unregulated or
otherwise (Pretty, 1995), but informality produces chal-
lenges in that accountability, monitoring, and enforce-
ment are not necessarily expected, as they might be in
formal systems.
IDG, may circumvent—intentionally or unintention-
ally—institutional and governmental policies and strate-
gies. While in some cases such informal action may
be acknowledged as helpful and be tacitly or explicitly
permitted, in other cases, informal action may be per-
ceived as challenging formal organisations and struc-
tures, including governments, leading to tensions and/or
putting informal actors at direct risk of censorship, pun-
ishment, or persecution. Conversely, similar aspects may
be at play with respect to vertical governance relations
when stronger parties divert the attention of formal in-
stitutions. Bradford (1998) shows how efforts by the
Government of Ontario to improve occupational health
and safety policies were undermined by advantaged pri-
vate sector representatives who were able to gain access
to senior officials through informal channels. Thus, while
governments can acknowledge their limitations and al-
low or actively support IDG, intra-community power re-
lations can also hinder IDG when powerful locals play ac-
tive roles in the formal structures. As shown empirically
for Malawi, even when FDG governmental mechanisms
are weak, post-disaster work typically needs them any-
way (Hendriks & Boersma, 2019). Bypassing government
for disaster governance, either IDG or FDG, might not al-
ways be possible or desirable.
A related important dimension is conflict potential,
extending not only to the access to resources for dis-
aster governance, but also to resource control. In infor-
mal situations, water, electricity, or similar ‘mafias’ ap-
pear (Mahadevia, 2015) which thus have the potential
to provide aid to the disaster-affected population at exor-
bitant prices, or prioritising/restricting the access of cer-
tain groups, along with price gouging for basic supplies
and services (Noy, 2018). Tendler (2002) refers to these
anti-development dynamics as ‘the devil’s deal’ that per-
petuates dependence rather than healthy, participatory
governance and political empowerment.
Meanwhile, informality may sometimes be encour-
aged by FDG actors because it assists them in reaching
their own goals. In traditional formal institutions, the
presence of (unsanctioned) informal set-ups does not
often grant weaker actors opportunities to vocalise or
pursue their preferences, leaving powerful actors freer
to dictate actions on the basis of their presumed su-
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perior agenda-setting power and bargaining leverage.
Personalities can make a difference, such as the per-
sonal friendship between the Greek and Turkish foreign
ministers in 1999 which assisted those two countries
in continuing to pursue rapprochement in the wake of
post-earthquake mutual aid, and the backlash to it, af-
ter earthquakes hit each country in August–September
1999 (Ker-Lindsay, 2000). Powerful players, even minis-
ters within the formal institutions of elected government,
can have strong incentives to steer institutional design
and actions based on, and towards, higher levels of in-
formality, such as friendship, particularly in situations
where their preferences and power are strong.
Finally, despite the resourcefulness, creativity, and
flexibility often inherent in informal networks—even
without being dominated or taken over by powerful
players—resources, skills, transparency, and accountabil-
ity can hamper effectiveness as a result of disorganisa-
tion, inadequate training, and being tasked with respon-
sibilities without concomitant resources (Meyer, 2017).
People implementing DRR/R can face the dilemma of
conflicting group loyalties when they find themselves
caught between obligations to family, other groups
they belong to or identify with, and emerging groups.
Killian (1952) calls this situation the conflict between or-
dinarily non-conflicting multiple group loyalties and it
can impede IDG by making its positive aspects appear to
entail disloyal and intractable choices.
3. Svalbard Norway as an IDG Case Study
Developing IDG in theory is a useful baseline but ex-
ploring it in practice is also helpful. A case study al-
ready known for its informality in numerous areas of so-
ciety, including health and safety, assists in examining
exactly what does or might happen with IDG in reality.
Settlements with small populations, such as on isolated
islands, are frequently touted and complimented for
their tight social networks and informal governance, with
the positives and negatives analysed (Baldacchino, 2018).
Grydehøj (2014) highlights the Svalbard archipelago as a
key global example.
Situated in the high Arctic, Svalbard belongs to
Norway by the Svalbard Treaty (1920) that governs it,
granting resource extraction and residence rights to cit-
izens of signatory countries. 80% of the population of
2,500–3,000 lives in the capital Longyearbyen, with the
mainly Russian Barentsburg being the territory’s second
largest settlement. Norway and Russia are the only coun-
tries that have maintained a reasonably continual pres-
ence on Svalbard since the archipelago was known to
be discovered. Svalbard’s inhabited areas are mostly in
coastal lowlands with risks from local sources being high-
lighted as aircraft and snowmobile crashes, polar bear
attacks, avalanches and other slides, floods, droughts,
and disease.
Svalbard epidemics were considered long before the
2020 Covid-19 outbreak. Examples are tapeworms, ra-
bies, and the re-emergence of a (potentially mutated)
H1N1 virus which previously killed miners on Svalbard
during the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic and which re-
mained in corpses’ tissues that failed to decompose in
Svalbard’s permafrost (Davis et al., 2000; Fuglei et al.,
2008; MacDonald et al., 2011). DRR/R discussions for
Svalbard’s diseases emphasise the spectre of a cruise
ship outbreak, for which norovirus is notable, especially
since many vessels carry more people than live around
Svalbard (Klein, 2010).
Svalbard’s healthcare facilities and services are
limited, with Longyearbyen’s small hospital and
Barentsburg’s clinic being the main options. A large in-
flux of ill patients and cases with major complications
would tax Svalbard’s healthcare services, especially in
cases such as Covid-19 with a high number of infectious
people requiring isolation. Awareness of this situation
around Svalbard is high, partially due to the cruise ships
reaching the islands on a near-monthly basis. The 2020
Covid-19 outbreak spreading on cruise ships around the
world, and the fact that the ships often dock in vari-
ous ports with passengers disembarking before an out-
break is identified, demonstrates the catastrophic conse-
quences which could impact Svalbard’s health systems.
With this knowledge, Svalbard swiftly enacted
Covid-19-related precautions, particularly protocols for
communication and patient evacuation to the nearest
mainland medical centre, Tromsø, Norway. As travel
restrictions became evident, Svalbard’s Governor soon
announced measures which banned visitors from non-
Nordic countries, quarantined tourists already there and
flew them to Oslo, and forced a seven-day self-isolated
period for those arriving in Svalbard’s other communities.
Nonetheless, locals described the initial official re-
sponse as patchy, confusing, and slow (personal com-
munication with a community member, 2020; Sabbatini,
2020a). As in other situations, on Svalbard or elsewhere,
the lack of focus on DRR and preparedness means that
disaster response plans are overemphasised which, in
turn, are often based on past experiences. Thus, dis-
aster scenarios that fall outside of past experiences
tend to pose significant challenges. This was previously
demonstrated in Svalbard’s 2015 and 2017 Longyearbyen
avalanches, the former of which destroyed eleven houses,
killed two people, and injured many more. Despite official
reports warning for years of Longyearbyen’s avalanche
risks (NGI, 1991, 1992, 2001), “no avalanche warning
was in operation” (Jaedicke, Hestnes, Bakkehøi, Mørk,
& Brattlien, 2016, p. 379). Moreover, previous experi-
ences with (fatal) avalanches on Svalbard predominately
referred to backcountry avalanches which became the
main focus of official DRR/R efforts.
Thus, both in the avalanches and during the 2020
Covid-19 outbreak, IDG as outlined in Sections 1 and 2
appeared, with residents unofficially stepping in. In the
2015 avalanche, over 150 citizens participated in the
search-and-rescue efforts, many of whom had been in-
formed of the disaster through an informal local mes-
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senger group and then arrived on scene prior to official
first responders helping, illustrating the noted IDG con-
cepts of volunteerism, self-organisation, convergence,
and zero-order responders. They rescued and evacuated
people and then provided officials with valuable knowl-
edge of homes’ physical layout, thereby facilitating the
finding of those trapped (Indreiten & Svarstad, 2016), ex-
actly as described in early research on aspects of infor-
mality in disasters (Form & Nosow, 1958).
Similarly, as FDG actors in Svalbard, the rest of Norway,
and elsewhere were caught somewhat off-guard regard-
ing the Covid-19 pandemic, local Svalbard residents took
initiatives to compensate for the lack of essential formal
disaster services. Using informal channels such as local
Facebook and WhatsApp groups, thereby governing by
bypassing governments and formal systems as described
in IDG’s theory, local residents offered services for those
self-isolated at home, including shopping, deliveries, free
psychosocial support, meditation, and yoga, along with
free babysitting for those who could not work from
home (Sabbatini, 2020b). As Sabbatini (2020a, 2020b) in-
dicates, the information was also reported and dissemi-
nated through a self-organised informal system, namely
the self-published icepeople.net, as per the communica-
tion structures theorised in IDG. Grassroots advocates in
Longyearbyen actively elevated discussions of compensa-
tion packages to the political level to benefit Svalbard’s im-
migrant workers who were laid off and left in a situation
of little-to-no social and legal support (personal commu-
nication with a community member, 2020). Meanwhile,
guides and other tourism personnel bypassed formal or-
ganisations to release their own statements, irrespective
of governmental guidelines, regarding their strategies for
making it through the crisis and moving forward including
through support from informal networks.
Such informal activities show the need for FDG actors,
including emergency responders, to go beyond recog-
nising ordinary citizens as merely participants to be in-
vited on FDG actors’ terms. Instead, as per the theory,
informal actors need to be accepted and leveraged as
key partners identifying and filling in important gaps,
thereby also relieving pressure on FDG actors while rais-
ing important issues which FDG might not have consid-
ered. Equally, recognising partners requires acknowledg-
ing each’s limitations and any problematic agendas, es-
pecially to admit, avoid, and overcome the dark sides of
IDG (Section 2.4). In the case of Svalbard and Covid-19,
the aforementioned delivery services could potentially
enact price gouging or other behaviour reminiscent of
the ‘devil’s deal’ from Tendler (2002). Even the free psy-
chosocial support generously offered raised questions re-
garding access, accountability, and ‘care for the carers.’
By providing an enabling environment before and
during disasters that overstretch FDG resources, such
as the Covid-19 pandemic in an isolated location with
limited healthcare resources, IDG could and should be
meaningfully harnessed. By careful integration and com-
plementarity with FDG actors, all expertise could be fully
used, rather than IDG’s dark sides dominating or IDG’s
actors being managed top-down or viewed as panicking
‘victims’ and/or bothersome problems to be ‘managed
away’ (Clarke, 2002; Ogie & Pradhan, 2019). As sponta-
neously happened around Svalbard for the avalanches
and Covid-19, which is typical of the governance culture
of the settlements (e.g., the local government using lo-
cal social media groups), Gaventa (2004, p. 21) describes
this task as no less than “the construction of new rela-
tionships between ordinary people and the institutions—
especially those of government—which affect their lives”
which constitutes a “key challenge for the 21st century.”
4. Conclusion: Towards IDG
This article reviewed IDG, indicated the positive and neg-
ative aspects, applied it to a specific case study histori-
cally and contemporarily, and suggested gaps which are
yet to be filled. Current (academic) reflection on IDG—
and its preoccupation with either interorganisational in-
formality or narrow concepts such as first/zero-order
responders, self-organisation, convergence, emergence,
and volunteerism—is insufficient to account for the ma-
jor role of IDG actors and their activities. The study of in-
formality itself is highly complex and can produce osten-
sible contradictions such as formalising informality and
seeking informal aspects within formality.
As with disasters themselves, the lack of definitional
consensus and the power connected with who decides
on what constitutes a ‘disaster,’ informal actors have long
suffered from a lack of voice due, in part, to an inherent
absence of a basic conceptualisation of the term. Thus,
we suggest the term IDG to indicate the increased role
that informality has vis-à-vis what is currently acknowl-
edged. In drawing on the theoretical and empirical dis-
cussion in this article, including the case study’s lessons,
the focus for recommendations is on high-level concep-
tual aspects to ensure an adequate academic grounding
in how IDG studies and actions develop while aiming to
provide baselines for overcoming IDG’s dark sides.
First, informality is not a new concept for DRR/R,
but IDG presents a novel framework for it, so it should
be used to understand informality in DRR/R and how
to best recognise and use it. Second, words matter and
the labelling, including translations beyond English, need
to be considered carefully, with the tenets taken seri-
ously and applied in practice. A unified framework with
a clear name, i.e., IDG, supports this approach and en-
sures an appropriate balance with the extensive work
on and acceptance of FDG. Third, accepting and apply-
ing IDG completes a much fuller DRR/R governance pic-
ture. By extension, an IDG-FDG dialogue may bring about
the changes necessary for disaster governance to be-
come more efficient and effective, a stated need and
goal within much DRR/R research and practice. IDG con-
tributes to resolving the long-term debate in DRR/R on
transparency, methods, legitimacy, and structures of cur-
rent disaster governance norms and means.
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Overarchingly, the ‘informality’ in IDG refers to in-
formal actors and informal actions in DRR/R, broadly
understood as individuals or groups (any actors) acting
voluntarily, in an impromptu or unplanned manner, or
because they feel they must, yet without having been
formally mandated and without any formal, systematic,
or necessarily structured fashion. We emphasise the no-
tion of ‘framework’ to avoid presenting IDG as merely a
new phrase for an old concept (or multitudes thereof).
Informal DRR/R does not need new names but rather a
framework to be filled with both long-standing and new
literature connecting theory and practice. Furthermore,
IDG needs to be studied comprehensively and critically
to avoid overly optimistic accounts and to go beyond
the simplistic rhetoric of formal vs. informal, of informal
as non-formal, or of top-down vs. bottom-up for disas-
ter governance.
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